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Constitutionally Protecting the Presumption 
of Innocence 
ANTHONY GRAY 
I INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been exponential growth in the use of so-called 
reverse onus provisions, placing the burden of proof in an unconventional 
way, particularly placing such a burden on a person who is accused of 
wrongdoing, rather than on the prosecution. Such laws are often thought 
necessary because, otherwise, it might be extremely difficult for the 
prosecutor to meet the required burden, sometimes because the person 
accused of wrongdoing has better access to relevant information in this 
regard. The purpose of this paper is to consider the extent to which 
reverse onus provisions are consistent with the presumption of innocence, 
and how an Australian court should deal with such provisions. In that 
regard, it will be useful to consider how overseas courts have approached 
such provisions, mindful as always of the different statutory and 
constitutional context in which different regimes operate. A recent High 
Court of Australia decision
1
 considered the presumption of innocence in 
the context of one of the few statutory human rights instruments existing 
in Australia, and that case will be critically considered.  
The classic statement of the importance of the presumption of innocence 
appears in the House of Lords decision in Woolmington v Director of 
Public Prosecutions
2
 where the court referred to it as the ‘golden thread’ 
running through English criminal law, subject to the defence of insanity 
and ‘subject to any statutory exception’.
3
 The House went on to conclude 
that ‘no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained’. Whilst this is a 
sound affirmation of the importance of such a right, it perhaps elides the 
fact that during earlier times when trial by ordeal or compurgation 
occurred, particularly prior to the use of juries, there was no such 
presumption.
4
   More importantly for present purposes, while it allows 
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3
 Ibid [7]. 
4
 Theodore Plunknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Lawbook Exchange, 1956), 
Barbara Hanwalt, Crime and Conflict in English Communities 1300-1348 (1979), Melville 
 
132 The University of Tasmania Law Review  Vol 31 No 1 2012 
 
that statutory exceptions might be made to the presumption, this was in 
the context of general common law acceptance of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary supremacy, by virtue of which no legal rights were sacred, 
and any were liable to be taken away by Parliament.
5
  This must be at 
least tempered now in the United Kingdom by the requirements of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK),
6
 about which more is said below. Further, 
in Australia, as I have written elsewhere, it is a mistake to apply the 
concept of Parliamentary supremacy in the same way as in the United 
Kingdom, given our written constitution and entrenchment of judicial 
review.
7
 
                                                                                                                             
Bigelow History of Procedure in England From the Norman Conquest (Harvard University 
Press, 1880) 322; Karl Kunert ‘Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence 
Rules Under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of ‘Free Proof’ in the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure’ (1959) 29 Buffalo Law Review 122; George Fletcher 
‘Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in 
Criminal Cases’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 880; William Laufer ‘The Rhetoric of 
Innocence’ (1995) 70 Washington Law Review 329. Sir William Blackstone Commentaries 
on the Laws of England: Book the Fourth (Clarendon, 1769) 352; Hobson’s Case (1823) 1 
Lew CC 261, 261 (‘It is a maxim of English law that it is better that ten guilty men should 
escape than that one innocent man should suffer’); Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of 
Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart, 2010) 1-4. It has clear links 
with the concept of ‘reasonable doubt’; some see the two as essentially one and the same 
doctrine; others see them as distinct doctrines. This debate need not be amplified for 
present purposes. 
5
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th
 ed, 1926) 38; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and 
Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
6
 In Jackson v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262, three members of the House of Lords 
openly questioned in obiter the parliamentary supremacy principle in its application to the 
United Kingdom (‘but Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute’ 
([104], Lord Hope), ‘the courts will treat with particular suspicion (and might even reject) 
any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing governmental action affecting the rights 
of the individual from all judicial powers’ ([159], Baroness Hale), and Lord Steyn, who 
referring to the principle as a creature of the common law, concluded ‘it is not unthinkable 
that circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established 
on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism’ ([102]); Lord Bingham ‘The Rule of Law 
and the Sovereignty of Parliament’ (2008) 19 Kings College Law Journal 223; Jeffrey 
Jowell ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis’ [2006] 
Public Law 562. 
7
 Anthony Gray ‘The Common Law and the Constitution as Protectors of Rights in 
Australia’ (2010) 39(2) Common Law World Review 119. The High Court in Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) could not have been clearer on this: 
‘The Constitution displaced, or rendered inapplicable, the English common law doctrine of 
the general competence and unqualified supremacy of the legislature’. Gummow J recently 
made the same point, indirectly, in Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34, [146], 
referring to the debate in the United Kingdom about how the discussion in the United 
Kingdom about the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) being designed to preserve 
Parliamentary sovereignty ‘speak[ing] to a non-Australian universe of constitutional 
discourse’.  
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There is a vast literature on the importance and theoretical underpinnings 
of the presumption. This includes judicial assertions that the public 
interest in ensuring that innocent people are not convicted greatly 
outweighs the public interest in ensuring that a particular criminal is 
brought to justice, in order to ensure public confidence in the judicial 
system.
8
 It includes claims that an onus on the defendant to disprove an 
accusation is ‘repugnant to ordinary notions of fairness’.
9
  Ashworth, a 
leading criminal law academic, defends the presumption on several bases. 
These include that (a) given the possible sanction of removing someone’s 
liberty, it is right that a high threshold is needed for that to happen; (b) 
there is always a risk of error in fact-finding in trials, and it is better that 
the Crown bear this risk;
10
 (c) police have far-reaching powers to conduct 
investigations and that these powers must be exercised in a way that 
properly respects human rights and freedoms; (d) typically the state’s 
resources far exceed that of any individual; and (e) the presumption of 
innocence is logically coherent with
11
 the principle of proof of a criminal 
charge beyond reasonable doubt.
12
 
The presumption of innocence appears in many international human 
rights instruments, including Article 14(2) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(2) of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, s11(d) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s25(c) of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s35(3)(h) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. An important limit on these provisions is that they 
                                                          
8
 The State v Coetzee and Others [1997] 2 LRC 593, 677 (Sachs J, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa); In Re Winship 397 US 358, 364 (Brennan, for five members of the Court), 
372 (Harlan J). 
9
 Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43, [9]; or a ‘fundamental 
principle of the common law’: Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co 
Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 501, 503 (Mason CJ and Toohey J), 527 (Deane, Dawson 
and Gaudron JJ), 550 (McHugh J). 
10
 See also In Re Winship 397 US 358, 375 (1970) (Brennan J, for five members of the 
Court). 
11
 There is debate about whether it is possible to have one without the other: Andrew 
Ashworth says that it is possible: ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 241, 250; French CJ in Momcilovic v The 
Queen [2011] HCA 34, [54] concludes that the presumption has not generally been 
regarded (in Australia) as logically distinct from the requirement that the prosecutor must 
prove an allegation beyond reasonable doubt. 
12
 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 241, 246-250; reverse legal onuses are 
‘anathema to the principles of the criminal law, which place a high premium on the value 
of a fair trial’: Andrew Geddis and Bridget Fenton ‘Which is to be Master? – Rights 
Friendly Statutory Interpretation in New Zealand and the United Kingdom’ (2008) 25(3) 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 733, 752; Ian Dennis ‘The Human 
Rights Act and the Law of Criminal Evidence: Ten Years On’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law 
Review 333, 354. 
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typically only apply when a person has been ‘charged with a criminal 
offence’. Sometimes, reverse onus issues have arisen in the context of 
‘civil forfeiture’ proceedings, under which the person who owns property 
is suspected of acquiring the property through unlawful means. 
Sometimes, such provisions require the owner of the property to prove, 
on the civil standard, the lawful means by which they acquired the 
property, and if they cannot do so, the property is forfeited to the Crown. 
This can occur although the person is not charged with any particular 
crime. I have argued elsewhere my belief that such proceedings are, in 
substance, criminal in nature, and so the protections that typically apply 
in criminal proceedings should apply to those proceedings, regardless of 
the ‘clothing’ in which those proceedings appear.
13
   
Although these are highly important debates, I will not re-visit that 
ground here. In this article, my focus will be on the presumption of 
innocence, in the context of the increasing number of provisions requiring 
the person affected to prove something in order to escape culpability. 
This is not an argument in the abstract. Specific current Australian 
examples include the unexplained wealth provisions in Part 2-6 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
14
 and equivalent state regimes.
15
 
Essentially, these provisions require that a person suspected of owning 
property acquired other than through lawful activity to prove the 
lawfulness by which they acquired the property, on the civil standard of 
proof. This requirement applies, in the case of the federal act, once there 
are reasonable grounds for suspecting the property was acquired other 
than through lawful means.  
                                                          
13
 Anthony Gray, ‘Forfeiture Provisions and the Criminal/Civil Divide’ (2012) 15(1) New 
Criminal Law Review 32; see also Kenneth Mann, ‘Punitive Civil Sanctions: The 
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law’ (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1795; Carol 
Steiker, ‘Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Civil-Criminal Procedure 
Divide’ (1997) 85 Georgetown Law Journal 775; Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, 
‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure 
and Sanctions’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21; Peter Wright, ‘Criminal 
Punishment Without Civil Rights: The Criminal Proceeds and Instrument Bill’s Punitive 
Civil Sanctions’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 623. 
14
 Section 179E(3) contains the reverse onus provision. The Act provides that a court may 
make an unexplained wealth order if a preliminary order has been made (based on some 
evidence provided by the prosecutor), and the court is not satisfied that the person’s wealth 
was not derived from commission of an offence. Section 179E(3) confirms that the onus is 
on the person to prove the lawfulness by which they acquired property, not the prosecutor 
to prove the unlawfulness by which the property was acquired. The person need not have 
been charged or convicted of any offence. 
15
 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) s 28B(3); Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic); 
Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld) s 83; Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 
2005 (SA) s 47(5); Serious and Organised Crime (Unexplained Wealth) Act 2009 (SA) 
(‘SA Act Two’); Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) ss 12(2) and s16(3); 
Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (NT) s 71(2); and Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 
2003 (ACT). 
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Such provisions typically allow forfeiture of the asset although the person 
who owns the asset has not been proven at the criminal standard to have 
committed a crime by which the asset was directly or indirectly obtained. 
Such provisions can be applied although the person has not been charged 
with any offence, has been charged and acquitted, or whether their 
conviction for an offence has been overturned on appeal.
16
  No specific 
offence need be identified by the Crown. Another example is the type of 
provision considered in the recent High Court decision in Momcilovic,
17
 
presuming that a person who occupies premises where drugs are found is 
actually in ‘possession’ of the drug, unless they prove otherwise.
18
  The 
offence of trafficking included, in that case, someone in possession of a 
prohibited drug, depending on quantity.  
A Consideration of Reverse Onus Schemes Elsewhere 
These kinds of reverse onus provisions, whilst they have grown 
exponentially in Australia in recent times, are not new or unique to 
Australia. They have been considered in substantial detail in other 
nations. Australia should at least consider how such provisions have been 
balanced against fundamental principles like presumption of innocence 
and fair trial in other legal systems.
19
  The volume of cases in other 
jurisdictions means that the courts elsewhere have had to grapple with 
many different contexts in which these issues arise. In the common law 
tradition, this has allowed courts in other jurisdictions to fine tune their 
principles in light of the sheer volume of cases and contexts in which 
authorities might seek to use these kinds of provisions.
20
 
 
                                                          
16
 References are to the Acts named in footnote 8: s80 (Cth), ss 6, 22(7) and 28C(4) 
(NSW), s 106(b) and (c) and 148 (WA), ss 12 and 140(b) and (c) (NT), s 61 (Qld), and ss 
47(2)(b) and 63 (SA). 
17
 Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34.  
18
 Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) s 71AC. I do not deal in detail 
with Momcilovic in this article because most of the issues with which it dealt are not 
considered directly relevant to the present discussion. 
19
 It is true that in many cases the High Court has not used international materials, however 
this practice seems to be slowly changing. For instance, in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 
177 CLR 292, particularly important in the current context, the majority made extensive 
use of international materials to support their view. Other recent examples include Roach v 
Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 and Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia 
(2008) 234 CLR 318; Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine Chiam, Devika Hovell and George 
Williams, No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law (University of New 
South Wales Press, 2006).  
20
 The High Court recently made this point, in denying the applicability of United Kingdom 
precedent concerning interpretation of its Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) to Australian 
charter provisions: Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34. 
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1 Canada 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that any person 
charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty.
21
  Section 1 of the Charter guarantees such right, and 
others, subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Similar facts to the Momcilovic case were considered in the leading 
Canadian decision of R v Oakes.
22
  The relevant section stated that if the 
Supreme Court found that the accused was in possession of a drug, they 
were presumed to be in possession for the purposes of trafficking, and 
unless the accused could convince the court of the contrary, they would 
be convicted of trafficking. The accused successfully argued that the 
provision was contrary to the presumption of innocence provided for by 
section 11(d). The Supreme Court of Canada was satisfied that the 
relevant provisions were not one of the ‘statutory exceptions’ provided 
for in Woolmington given the fact that Canada had ‘tempered’ 
parliamentary supremacy.
23
  As read, the provision allowed the possibility 
that a person could be convicted despite the existence of reasonable 
doubt, because the accused bore the burden of disproving an essential 
element of the offence.
24
 A conviction in such cases would be ‘radically 
and fundamentally inconsistent with the societal values of human dignity 
and liberty which we espouse’.
25
 The court rejected application of the s 1 
saving provision;
26
 and the mere fact that someone had a small quantity 
of drugs did not necessarily mean they were traffickers.
27
  Such issues 
have also arisen in the context of using an accused’s silence as evidence 
of guilt, with the Supreme Court in R v Noble concluding that such an 
approach violates the presumption of innocence protected by s11.
28
  
                                                          
21
 Section 11(d). 
22
 [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
23
 Ibid [39]. 
24
 Ibid [57]. 
25
 Ibid [61]. 
26
 The court said three factors were relevant to s 1 considerations: (a) whether the relevant 
measures were of sufficient importance to justify overriding a constitutionally protected 
right or freedom, (b) if the first element exists, whether the means chosen are reasonable 
and demonstrably justified (proportionality test), taking into account whether the measures 
chosen were carefully designed to achieve the object in question or whether they were 
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations, and whether, if rationally connected 
to the objective, they impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question. Thirdly, 
there had to be proportionality between the effect of the measures responsible for limiting 
the Charter right or freedom, and the object identified as of sufficient importance. 
27
 In contrast, the court was satisfied in R v Whyte [1988] 2 SCR that a rational connection 
existed between the thing presumed and the act prohibited.  
28
 [1997] 1 SCR 874; Lamer CJ (dissenting) in that case drew a distinction between 
provisions presuming the offence itself (offensive to the Charter), and provisions 
presuming a key element of an offence (presumably, valid) [34]. 
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In R v Schwartz the Supreme Court considered provisions criminalising 
possession of a restricted weapon without a registration certificate.
29
  The 
onus was expressly placed on the accused to prove on the civil standard 
that they held such a certificate. A majority of the court found that the 
provision did not create a reverse onus provision because the accused was 
not required to prove or disprove any element of the offence. There was 
no possibility that the accused could be found guilty of a crime, despite 
the existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt.
30
  The dissenters, 
reinforcing the fundamental importance of the presumption of innocence, 
applied the Oakes approach, and found that the provision relieved the 
Crown of the onus of proving an essential element of the offence charged; 
the Act did not merely impose an evidentiary burden on the accused but a 
legal burden, and although the Act was designed to meet a legitimate 
objective, it failed the proportionality test – its burden on a fundamental 
freedom was significant, in the context where it would not be difficult for 
the Crown to prove whether or not the accused had a certificate.
31
 
In essence, the Canadian court has been concerned that there be no 
interference with the Crown’s obligation to prove that the accused 
committed each of the elements of the alleged crime beyond reasonable 
doubt.
32
 
2 Europe 
Most of the discussion here has related to Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, subsection (2) of which requires that every 
person charged with a criminal offence be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law, and subsection (1) of which requires that 
in the determination of a criminal charge, everyone is entitled to a fair 
hearing.
33
  How have these provisions been applied to reverse onus 
provisions? 
                                                          
29
 [1988] 2 SCR 443. 
30
 Ibid [79]-[80] (McIntyre, La Forest and L’Heureux-Dube JJ). 
31
 Ibid [32]-[34] (Dickson CJ and Lamer J). 
32
 For a critique, see Ian Laing ‘R v Noble: The Supreme Court and the Permissible Use of 
Silence’ (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 638. It is considered to be beyond the scope of this 
article to critique the Canadian jurisprudence here; rather I am using the case law as 
examples of how the courts elsewhere have reconciled the presumption of innocence with 
other interests. 
33
 Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010); David Hamer ‘A Dynamic Reconstruction of the 
Presumption of Innocence’ (2011) 31(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 417; Victor 
Tadros and Stephen Tierney ‘The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act’ 
(2004) 67(3) Modern Law Review 402. It is considered to be beyond the scope of this 
article to critique the European jurisprudence here; rather, I am using the case law as 
examples of how the courts elsewhere have reconciled the presumption of innocence with 
other interests. 
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The starting point is the proposition from the European Court that 
presumptions of fact or law are not necessarily incompatible with the 
requirements of Article 6; as with most of the Convention rights, 
intrusions are permissible where they are confined within ‘reasonable 
limits’. The European Court has specifically required that during such an 
analysis in the context of a reverse onus provision, the court must ‘take 
into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of 
the defence’.
34
  This has translated in some cases to the position that the 
more serious the offence in terms of its nature and attendant penalty, the 
stronger the justification for intrusion needed.
35
  Proportionality between 
the extent of interference and the legitimate aim sought to be achieved is 
important.
36
 Evidentiary onuses may be more likely to be compatible with 
the requirements of Article 6(2) than legal or persuasive onuses.
37
 The 
Court has read the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2) as being 
encompassed within the right to a fair trial in Article 6(1),
38
 such that Art 
6(2) could technically be seen as redundant. 
One case very close in facts to the kinds of laws considered here is 
Geerings v The Netherlands.
39
  The case concerned an accused charged 
with theft. He was originally convicted, but on appeal, most of his 
convictions were overturned. The government commenced confiscation 
proceedings against him, in respect both of property acquired from the 
offence with which he had been finally convicted, and in respect of 
property acquired from offences where the appellant’s conviction had 
been overturned. The domestic law specifically allowed a confiscation 
order to be made if there were ‘sufficient indications’ that the applicant 
had committed offences. The government was required to provide a prima 
facie case; the accused was then required to rebut it. In this way, there are 
strong similarities with regimes currently operating in Australian states, 
allowing the government to apply for a forfeiture order although the 
person was acquitted of a relevant criminal offence, or had a relevant 
conviction quashed on appeal.
40
 
                                                          
34
 Salabiaku v France [1988] ECHR 19. 
35
 Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43, [6]. 
36
 Principal Reporter v K and Others [2010] UKSC 56, [43]; in R v Johnstone [2003] 
UKHL 28, [49], the court spoke of the need for a ‘compelling reason’; Mayor of Hounslow 
v Powell [2011] UKSC 8, [73]. 
37
 R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; R v Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326. 
38
 Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43, [9]; Phillips v United 
Kingdom (Application No. 41087/98) (5 July 2001), [40]; Heaney and McGuinness v 
Ireland [2000] ECHR 684. 
39
 [2007] ECHR 191. 
40
 See references in footnotes 14-16. There are also some analogies with Momcilovic, 
where a presumption of guilt was made in relation to ‘possession’ of drugs found on 
premises, subject to the occupier of the premises disproving guilt. 
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The accused successfully argued in the European Court of Human Rights 
that such provisions were incompatible with the right to presumption of 
innocence provided for in Article 6(2): 
The Court reiterates that the presumption of innocence, guaranteed by 
Article 6(2), will be violated if a judicial decision or a statement by a 
public official concerning a person charged with a criminal offence 
reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved guilty 
according to law
41
 ... confiscation ... is a measure inappropriate to assets 
which are not known to have been in the possession of the person 
affected, the more so if the measure concerned relates to a criminal act of 
which the person affected has not actually been found guilty. If it is not 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the person affected has actually 
committed the crime, and if it cannot be established as fact that any 
advantage ... was actually obtained, such a measure can only be based on 
a presumption of guilt.
42
 
Another case very similar in fact is McIntosh v Her Majesty’s Advocate.
43
  
There the litigation involved provisions dealing with the forfeiture of 
assets held by a person convicted of a drug trafficking offence. It 
provided that property acquired or held by that person at certain times 
prior to and following their conviction could be presumed by the court (if 
it wished) to have been unlawfully acquired, unless the offender could 
show otherwise. 
A majority of the Scottish High Court found the provisions to be 
incompatible with the requirements of Article 6(2). Lord Prosser 
concluded: 
By asking the court to make a confiscation order, the prosecutor is asking 
it to assess the value of the proceeds of the petitioner’s drug trafficking. It 
is therefore asking the court to reach the stage of saying that he has 
trafficked in drugs. If that is criminal, that seems to be to be closely 
analogous to an actual charge of an actual crime ... There is of course no 
indictment or complaint and no conviction ... a complaint or indictment 
would have to be specific, and would require evidence, whereas this 
particular allegation was inspecific and based upon no evidence. But the 
suggestion that there is less need for a presumption of innocence in the 
latter situation appears to me to be somewhat Kafkaesque, and to portray 
a vice as a virtue. With no notice of what he is supposed to have done, or 
of any basis which there might be for treating him as having done it, the 
accused’s need for the presumption of innocence is in my opinion all the 
greater.
44
 
                                                          
41
 Geerings v The Netherlands [2007] ECHR 191, [41]. 
42
 Ibid [47]. 
43
 [2000] ScotHC 97; Her Majesty’s Advocate v McIntosh (Scotland) [2001] UKPC D1. 
44
 Ibid [30], with whom Lord Allanbridge agreed. 
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Lord Prosser claimed that the legislation allowed for confiscation 
although the person affected had not been convicted of any offence, and 
found that the confiscation proceedings amounted to a ‘charge’ within the 
meaning of Article 6(2).
45
  It is true that the finding of incompatibility 
was overturned by the Privy Council, but this was on the basis that the 
confiscation proceedings followed a finding in a criminal trial, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the person had committed a drug trafficking 
offence. This meant that the confiscation proceeding did not amount to 
the bringing of a ‘charge’ within the meaning of Article 6(2).
46
  This 
Privy Council decision is thus consistent with other European decisions 
confirming the validity of confiscation proceedings following conviction, 
and the general non-application of Article 6(2) to such proceedings.
47
  It 
does not detract from the argument made here, which is with the use of 
reverse onus provisions in forfeiture proceedings in the absence of a 
conviction against the person affected.  
3 United States 
The United States Bill of Rights does not expressly contain an enshrined 
right to presumption of innocence, but it has been held that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, guaranteeing a right not to be deprived of life, 
liberty or property (emphasis added, given the context of this 
article)(‘due process rights’) include the presumption of innocence.
48
  
This jurisprudence is considered to be applicable to the present discussion 
of the Australian position, given the explicit acceptance by members of 
the High Court that the Australian Constitution provides for protection of 
some kind of ‘due process’.
49
  It is considered to be a reasonable 
assumption that ‘due process’ in the context of the United States is not 
materially different from due process in Australia.
50
 
                                                          
45
 Ibid [9]. 
46
 Her Majesty’s Advocate and Anor v McIntosh [2001] UKPC D1. 
47
 Grayson and Barnham v United Kingdom (Application Nos. 19955/05 and 
15085/06)[2008] ECHR 8; R v Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19. 
48
 In Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970). 
49
 For example, Deane J refers to s 71 as the Constitution’s ‘only general guarantee of due 
process’: Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580. Members of the Court have 
made reference to Chapter III not permitting a court to be given functions which are 
inconsistent with the nature of judicial power or the essential requirements of a court: 
Polyukovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J), 685, 689 (Toohey J) 
and 703-704 (Gaudron J); Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1; 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; South Australia v 
Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1. 
50
 This is given the fact that the founding fathers drew heavily on the American 
Constitution and greatly admired it: Owen Dixon Jesting Pilate (Hein, 1965) 102, 104. 
Specific examples of the application of United States constitutional principles to the 
Australian constitutional context are too numerous to mention; fundamental examples 
include the acceptance of judicial review: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth 
(1951) 83 CLR 1, 263, citing Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137, and the use of the 
 
Book Reviews  141 
 
The Court has been mindful of the fact that legislatures may resort to 
indirect means to subvert the guarantee of presumption of innocence,
51
 
and recognised the threat to due process constitutional rights more 
generally posed by the use of presumptions:   
The use of presumptions and inferences to prove an element of a crime is 
indeed treacherous, for it allows men to go to jail without any evidence 
on one essential ingredient of the offense. It thus implicates the integrity 
of the judicial system ... In practical effect, the use of these presumptions 
often means that the great barriers to the protection of procedural due 
process contained in the bill of rights are subtly diluted.
52
 
In In Re Winship, a majority of the Supreme Court dismissed an argument 
that criminal due process rights should not apply there because the 
proceedings, against a juvenile, were said to be protective and remedial 
rather than punitive. The majority considered the substance of the 
proceedings were criminal, despite the label. It has confirmed that 
anything that affects the penalty for a criminal offence must be proven at 
the standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
53
  It has not permitted transfers 
of a legal burden of proof to the defence to show that a partial defence to 
the charge exists.
54
 Sometimes, a distinction is drawn between 
presumptions that must be made, and presumptions that may be made. It 
                                                                                                                             
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ test of determining the constitutional validity of 
federal law: McCullough v Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316, 321 (Marshall CJ), applied in 
many Australian cases, including Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. On 
Australian due process, see Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and 
Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23 Monash University Law 
Review 248, Michael McHugh, ‘Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as 
Well as Procedural Rights?’ (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235.  
51
 Estelle v Williams 425 US 501, 503 (1976); Mullaney v Wilbur 421 US 684, 698 (1975). 
52
 Barnes v United States 412 US 837, 850 (1973) (Brennan J, with whom Marshall J 
agreed). 
53
 Apprendi v New Jersey 530 US 466 (2000). 
54
 Mullaney v Wilbur 421 US 684 (1975) (on due process grounds); the court has also 
debated the extent to which lawmakers might be able to reclassify what might in the past 
have been elements of an offence to affirmative defences, in order to effect a transfer of the 
burden of proof: Patterson v New York 432 US 197 (1977); the majority there 
acknowledged simply that in this regard, there were ‘obviously’ constitutional limits 
beyond which the states may not go in that regard (without specifying them) (210); see the 
criticism by Powell J (with whom Brennan and Marshall JJ agreed) (223); Kenneth 
Campbell wrote about this, arguing that a substantive view needed to be taken, and that in 
substance an offence included things against which the law said there was a prima facie 
reason, while a defence in substance related to exonerating conditions: Criminal Law and 
Justice: Essays from the W G Hart Workshop (Sweet and Maxwell, 1987) 73; Richard 
Glover, ‘Regulatory Offences and Reverse Burdens: The ‘Licensing Approach’ (2007) 71 
Criminal Law Journal 259; Glanville Williams, ‘Offences and Defences’ (1982) 2 Legal 
Studies 233; Glanville Williams, ‘The Logic of Exceptions’ (1988) Cambridge Law 
Journal 261 agreed that a substantive view needed to be taken. See Andrew Stumer, The 
Presumption of Innocence: Evidence and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 
2010) ch 3.  
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is much more likely to accept the latter than the former:
55
 ‘a mandatory 
presumption is a far more troublesome evidentiary device’.
56
  The Court 
has insisted, at the very least, on a rational connection between the fact 
proved and the ultimate fact presumed; it is concerned that arbitrary 
presumptions not be made.
57
  The Court has not been impressed with 
purported justifications for reverse onus provisions based on the fact that 
the relevant evidence is more easily obtainable by the ‘accused’ person.
58
  
It has acknowledged that these kinds of presumption provisions might 
also violate the right to silence.
59
 In essence, the American Supreme 
Court has robustly defended the presumption of innocence against 
legislative incursion, including by the use of presumptions against the 
accused.
60
 
                                                          
55
 County Court of Ulster County v Allen 442 US 140 (1979); United States v Gainey 380 
US 63 (1965). When the court refers to a permissive inference, it means one that the fact 
finder may, but need not, make, and which imposes no burden of any kind on the 
defendant. When the court refers to a mandatory presumption, it means the fact finder must 
make the presumption of the new fact based on the existence of the old fact, at least unless 
the person affected can rebut the presumption. This is explained in Allen (157). 
56
 County Court of Ulster County v Allen 442 US 140, 157 (1979). 
57
 United States v Romano 382 US 136 (1965); this principle has caused significant 
fracturing amongst the Supreme Court in application to statutes that allow (or require) a 
court to presume from the fact that a person is at an illegal distilling premises that they are 
guilty of possession/production/conspiracy to produce offences, or that from the fact that a 
person has possession of something unlawful, that they are guilty of doing so knowingly: 
County Court of Ulster County v Allen 442 US 140 (1979) (presumption that occupants of 
a vehicle in which firearms were present were in illegal possession unless they could prove 
otherwise, presumption was voluntary – validity upheld); inferring from unexplained 
possession of stolen mail that the possessor knew it was stolen upheld (Barnes v United 
States 412 US 837 (1973)); presumption that unexplained possession meant person knew 
drugs were unlawfully imported upheld but presumption that possession of a certain 
quantity meant that possessor was intending to supply struck out (Turner v United States 
396 US 398 (1970); presumption that presence at an illegal ‘still’ was sufficient to 
authorise conviction for possession/control/production/conspiracy to produce overturned in 
United States v Romano 382 US 136 (1965); possession of marijuana deemed sufficient for 
conviction on offence of receiving the drug knowing it had been imported illegally, unless 
the defendant could explain otherwise overturned in Leary v United States 395 US 6 
(1969); in a statute making it an offence for a convict to receive a gun in an interstate 
transaction, the court was to presume that possession was in breach of the Act – overturned 
on due process grounds (Tot v United States 319 US 463 (1943)).  
58
 Tot v United States 319 US 463, 469 (1943)(unanimous). The American cases are 
discussed in more detail in John Jeffries and Paul Stephan ‘Defenses, Presumptions and 
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 1325, Scott Sundby 
‘The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence’ (1989) 40 Hastings Law 
Journal 457, and Theodore Gottfried and Peter Baroni ‘Presumptions, Inferences and Strict 
Liability in Illinois Criminal Law: Pre-empting the Presumption of Innocence’ (2008) 41 
John Marshall Law Review 715. 
59
 Turner v United States 396 US 398, 433 (1970) (Black J, dissenting on other grounds). 
60
 There is a vast jurisprudence: see, eg, William Laufer ‘The Rhetoric of Innocence’ 
(1995) 70 Washington Law Review 329; John Jeffries and Paul Stephan ‘Defenses, 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 1325; 
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II AUSTRALIAN JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING REVERSE 
ONUS PROVISIONS 
Australian courts have generally taken a laissez-faire approach when 
questions of the constitutional validity of reverse onus provisions have 
been raised.
61
 For example, in the early case of Williamson v Ah On,
62
 the 
High Court validated a provision requiring a person charged with being 
an illegal immigrant to prove that they were not within the provisions of 
the Act. Those members of the court who justified such a provision in the 
face of arguments about the presumption of innocence did so on the basis 
that the reverse onus requirement was needed to enforce immigration 
laws,
63
 or that the general principle was subject to exceptions, particularly 
where the subject matter of the allegation lies ‘peculiarly within the 
knowledge of one of the parties’,
64
 or that within heads of power 
Commonwealth law was ‘omnipotent’.
65
 In cases like Milicevic v 
Campbell
66
 and Leask v Commonwealth,
67
 the High Court again 
confirmed that there was no constitutional difficulty where an Act, 
otherwise within a head of power, included a reverse onus provision. 
                                                                                                                             
Peter Baroni ‘Presumptions, Inferences and Strict Liability in Illinois Criminal Law: 
Preempting the Presumption of Innocence’ (2008) 41 John Marshall Law Review 715. It is 
considered to be beyond the scope of this article to critique the American jurisprudence 
here; rather I am using the case law as examples of how the courts elsewhere have 
reconciled the presumption of innocence with other interests. 
61
 Of course, principles of statutory interpretation can be utilised, such as that where 
provisions of an Act are ambiguous, they should be interpreted so as not to interfere with 
established common law rights, and/or a presumption that statutes are not intended to 
trample on established common law rights: Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277; 
Melbourne Corporation v Barry (1922) 31 CLR 174. 
62
 (1926) 39 CLR 95. 
63
 Ibid 104 (Isaacs J); see also Commonwealth v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners 
(1922) 31 CLR 1, 12: ‘A law does not usurp judicial power because it regulates the method 
or burden of proving facts’ (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ). 
64
 Ibid 113 (Isaacs J), citing United Kingdom authorities for this principle; 127 (Powers J) 
(‘those within the personal knowledge of the person charged’); David Hamer, ‘A Dynamic 
Reconstruction of the Presumption of Innocence’ (2011) 31(2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 417, 432. 
65
 Ibid 302 (Knox CJ and Gavan Duffy JJ), dissenting in the result because they did not 
think Parliament had power to define for itself the very word that gave them the 
constitutional power, ‘immigrant’; 127 (Rich and Starke JJ), claiming that just as the 
United Kingdom Parliament could pass whatever laws of evidence it deems expedient, 
including burden of proof, so too could the Commonwealth, provided they had a head of 
power. 
66
 (1975) 132 CLR 307. 
67
 (1996) 187 CLR 579; in this case, subject to dicta comments of Kirby J, who claimed 
that in an extreme case, a reverse onus provision could mean there was not sufficient 
connection between the law and the head of power, or the law may be so disproportionate 
to the legitimate attainment of the subject matter of that head as to lead to constitutional 
invalidity (636). 
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The same attitude appears in the recent High Court decision of 
Momcilovic v The Queen.
68
  The case involved, among other things, 
questions about the validity of a reverse onus provision (s 5 of the Act), 
deeming that something found on the premises of a person was in that 
person’s possession (for the purposes of the Act), unless they proved to 
the contrary. French CJ was in no doubt that displacement of the common 
law presumption of innocence was contemplated by the regime, and had 
no constitutional difficulty with such a finding: 
The concept of the presumption of innocence is part of the common law 
of Australia, subject to its statutory qualification or displacement in 
particular cases ... that protective operation (of the common law) is 
ineffective against the clear language of s 5.
69
 
This Australian jurisprudence, such as it is, should be challenged. I 
believe that Australian courts have been too submissive to Parliament, in 
allowing it to take away fundamental rights such as the presumption of 
innocence.   
For instance, to accept, as some High Court judges did in Williamson,
70
 
and members of the House of Lords did in Johnstone
71
 and Lambert,
72
 
that difficulties for the prosecution in proving a matter that is often within 
the means of knowledge of the accused justify a departure from the 
general principle is to undermine that principle. Of course, it will often, if 
not usually, be the case that a person accused of a crime would be in a 
                                                          
68
 [2011] HCA 34. The Williamson decision was not cited in Momcilovic, but the argument 
accepted in the former case, that the reverse onus approach was necessary to effectively 
enforce the law, might also have used in the Momcilovic case in relation to drug law 
enforcement. However, the counter-argument is the ‘slippery slope’; one could often, if not 
always, argue, that crime investigation would be better facilitated with a reverse onus. If 
we accept that justification for relaxation of the presumption of innocence in some 
contexts, it becomes difficult to draw the line between others. 
69
 Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34, [53], [55]; other judges did not need to 
address this issue in order to decide the issues raised, so this discussion cannot be amplified 
further; cf the United States Supreme Court’s finding in Bozza v United States 330 US 160 
that it was not permissible to presume ‘possession’ from presence; see also United States v 
Romano 382 US 136, 141: ‘presence tells us only that the defendant was there ... but tells 
us nothing about what the defendant’s specific function was and carries no legitimate, 
rational or reasonable inference that he was engaged in one of the specialised functions 
connected with possession, rather than in one of the supply, delivery or operational 
activities having nothing to do with possession. Presence is relevant and admissible 
evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some showing of the defendant’s 
function at the still, its connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable 
inference of guilt’. For a thorough recent review of the Momcilovic litigation, see Julie 
Debeljak, ‘Who is Sovereign Now? The Momcilovic Court Hands Back Power Over 
Human Rights That Parliament Intended It to Have’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 15. 
70
 (1926) 39 CLR 95, 113 (Isaacs J), 127 (Powers J). 
71
 R v Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28, [52]-[53]. 
72
 R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37, [36]. 
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good position to lead evidence of what actually happened, since they may 
have been there. This argument about convenience and ease of proof was 
not thought to outweigh the dangers of a presumption of guilt when 
presumption of innocence was eventually settled in the common law; it 
should not be sufficient now. Acceptance of that argument could justify 
departure from the principle in the most serious cases, including alleged 
murder and rape. The accused may well have been there and have 
firsthand knowledge of events; this does not justify a presumption of guilt 
because the prosecution was not there and finds it harder to show what 
happened. Of course, this would have flow-on implications for the notion 
of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the right to silence.
73
 The result 
could well be, as Sachs J said in The State v Coetzee and Others,
74
 that 
‘nothing would be left of the presumption of innocence, save, perhaps, for 
its relic status as a doughty defender of rights in the most trivial of cases’. 
The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected this justification for 
departing from the presumption of innocence in Tot;
75
 so should an 
Australian court.  
Further, the idea, expressed by members of the High Court in Williamson 
(and perhaps implicit in the words of French CJ above in Momcilovic) 
that within given heads of power, the power of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to pass laws is ‘omnipotent’ does not withstand serious 
scrutiny, at least with what we know today. Today, we know that 
implications have been drawn from the text of the constitution, and that 
laws inconsistent with such implications have been declared by the High 
Court to be constitutionally invalid. Examples include the so-called 
Melbourne Corporation doctrine,
76
 limiting the extent to which the 
Commonwealth can legislate to affect the States, the implied freedom of 
political communication,
77
 and implied limits imposed by Chapter III of 
the Constitution.
78
 So with due respect to judges in earlier cases 
(particularly in Williamson, at which time the idea of implications in the 
Constitution must have seemed peculiar given the Engineers
79
 decision), 
laws that interfere with fundamental rights like presumption of innocence 
should not (must not) be countenanced on the idea that Parliament, within 
                                                          
73
 This is a separate topic of its own, though there are clear links between presumption of 
innocence and the right to silence. Abrogation of the presumption of innocence amounts 
also, in effect, to abrogation of the right to silence. I intend to write separately about the 
right to silence in a future article.  
74
 [1997] 2 LRC 593, 677. 
75
 319 US 463, 469 (1943): ‘Nor can the fact that the defendant has the better means of 
information, standing alone, justify the creation of such a presumption. In every criminal 
case the defendant has at least an equal familiarity with the facts and in most a greater 
familiarity with them than the prosecution’ (Roberts J, for the court). 
76
 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31. 
77
 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
78
 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
79
 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
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given heads of power, is ‘omnipotent’, and to the extent that such an idea 
is derived from the British principle of parliamentary sovereignty, such a 
concept is not applicable, as a unanimous High Court said in Lange,
80
 and 
as Gummow J acknowledged recently in Momcilovic, in the Australian 
context of a written Constitution and judicial review.
81
 
I will now consider the jurisprudential basis upon which an Australian 
court might strike out as constitutionally invalid a law overturning the 
presumption of innocence. Of course, this occurs in a context where there 
is no bill of rights in Australia, and no express protection of a 
presumption of innocence in a national bill of rights.
82
  Accordingly, the 
discussion will necessarily be limited to relevant implications in the 
Constitution that might pertain to the issues. 
A Constitutional Arguments- The Right to a Fair Trial and the 
Kable Principle 
I will argue in this section of the paper that, despite the absence of an 
express bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, aspects of Australian 
constitutional law may be utilised in defending the fundamental 
                                                          
80
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ): ‘The Constitution displaced, or rendered inapplicable, 
the English common law doctrine of the general competence and unqualified supremacy of 
the legislature’; Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 570: 
‘constitutional norms which apply in this country are more complex than an unadorned 
Diceyan precept of parliamentary sovereignty’.  
81
Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34, [145]; in support of Gummow J’s statements, 
according to Dicey, the leading academic advocate of parliamentary supremacy, the three 
criteria of a sovereign law-making body are (a) there is no law which Parliament cannot 
change; (b) there is no distinction between laws which are not fundamental or 
constitutional and laws which are fundamental or constitutional; and (c) there is no body 
which can pronounce void any enactment passed by parliament on the ground that the 
enactment is contrary to the constitution: Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 1885) 170. At the very least, neither (a) nor (c) applies 
in Australia. The first requirement is not applicable because we have accepted the validity 
of manner and form provisions (eg s 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution, s6 of the 
Australia Act 1986 (UK)  in relation to the states); the third requirement is not satisfied 
because the Australian High Court has accepted the doctrine of judicial review implicit in a 
written constitution. Dicey himself, observing the American constitutional system but in 
terms equally applicable to Australia, spoke of the United States Supreme Court as being 
the sovereign law-making body, not the ‘parliament’ of the United States or individual 
states (170-171). In Jesting Pilate (Hein, 1965) 200, Sir Owen Dixon stated that the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy related (only) to the Parliament at Westminster. 
82
 The presumption of innocence is referred to in state rights instruments, but these 
instruments, at their strongest, permit only a declaration of incompatibility, rather than a 
finding of constitutional invalidity. Some judges in the recent High Court decision in 
Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34 suggested that the state rights instruments merely 
reflect the common law principle of legality, that a statute was presumed not to be intended 
to interfere with common law rights and freedoms (eg French CJ [43], Crennan and Kiefel 
JJ [565]).  
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presumption of innocence.
83
 These constitutional arguments concern, 
alternatively, (a) the right to a fair trial; and (b) the so-called Kable 
principle. 
1 Right to a Fair Trial 
Five members of the High Court of Australia in the landmark decision of 
Dietrich v The Queen
84
 found that the right to a fair trial was fundamental 
to the Australian legal system.
85
 Some of them based this right on the 
implicit requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution which established 
the judicial branch of government.
86
 Members of the court also alluded to 
the court’s inherent power to stay proceedings to prevent what would 
otherwise be an abuse of process.
87
 If confirmation is needed that a 
presumption of innocence is part of the right to a fair trial, it appears in 
some of the European cases, and in dicta comments in one Australian 
case.
88
 According to the European Court of Human Rights in The Case of 
Phillips v United Kingdom: 
 
A person’s right in a criminal case to be presumed innocent and to require 
the prosecution to bear the onus of proving the allegations against him or 
her forms part of the general notion of a fair hearing.
89
 
                                                          
83
 Rather than the concept of a ‘fair trial’, some might use the (related) principle of ‘due 
process’. Re Nolan; Ex Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Dietrich v The 
Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326 (Deane J), 362 (Gaudron J) refer to the exercise of 
judicial power in accordance with the ‘judicial process’; Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, 
Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 
205; Will Bateman, ‘Procedural Due Process Under the Australian Constitution’ (2009) 31 
Sydney Law Review 411. However, note the suggestions in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 
CLR 307 that the requirement that courts not be asked to exercise functions that are 
inconsistent with the nature of judicial process or judicial power may be narrower than a 
requirement of ‘due process’ (355)(Gummow and Crennan JJ); French CJ also expressed 
some hesitancy about a ‘due process’ requirement in International Finance Trust v New 
South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 353. 
84
 (1992) 177 CLR 292; see also Jago v District Court (NSW)(1989) 168 CLR 23, per 
Mason CJ (29), Deane J (56), Toohey J (72) and Gaudron J (75). 
85
 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 298 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 326 (Deane 
J), 353 (Toohey J), 362 (Gaudron J). 
86
 Ibid 326 (Deane J), 362 (Gaudron J).  
87
 Ibid 293 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
88
 Kirby J (dissenting) in Carr v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138, 172, referring to 
the need for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, rather than for the accused to 
prove their innocence, stated this principle was ‘deeply embedded in the procedures of 
criminal justice in Australia ... It may even be implied in the assumption about fair trial in 
the Australian Constitution’.  
89
 (2001) Application No. 41087/98, 12/12/2001, [40]; see also Sheldrake v Director of 
Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43, where Lord Bingham, with whom Lords Steyn and 
Phillips agreed, confirmed that ‘the presumption of innocence is one of the elements of the 
fair criminal trial provided by Article 6(1)’: [9]. 
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It is acknowledged that the right to a fair trial comprises a bundle of 
rights, one of which is the presumption of innocence, and these rights can 
be ranked according to derogability. However, amongst these rights, the 
presumption of innocence is fundamental.
90
 
My argument is that reverse onus provisions, of the kind that appear in 
proceeds of crime law like the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
91
 and 
state equivalents,
92
 and of the kind that appeared in the drug laws 
considered by the High Court in Momcilovic, fall foul (or may fall foul) 
of the constitutional right to a fair trial.
93
  In my opinion, these provisions 
are contrary to the requirement of a fair trial implicit in Chapter III of the 
Constitution. This view is supported by relevant European authorities, 
and by a substantive approach rather than a procedural approach to 
rights.
94
  In terms of Campbell’s substance-based distinction between 
offences and defences – the former being things against which the law 
says there is a prima facie reason, the latter being ‘exonerating 
conditions’ – the question of whether property has been acquired lawfully 
or not is surely in substance of the former category, not the latter.
95
  I also 
                                                          
90
 Gridin v Russian Federation, Communication No770/1997 (UNHRC); UNHRC General 
Comment No. 29, (2001) [11], UNHRC General Comment No. 13 (1987) [7]. 
91
 Section 179E(4). 
92
 Above, n 13. 
93
 Wheeler made this argument in an important article, suggesting that if Parliament placed 
the burden of proof on a defendant in a federal context, ‘this is prima facie to ask a court ... 
to conduct an unfair criminal trial because of the risk that under such circumstances a 
defendant will be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her 
guilt’: Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally 
Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248, 
272. On whether the right to a fair trial is ‘constitutional’ or not, two members of the High 
Court in Dietrich, Deane (326) and Gaudron J (362), said it was implicit in Chapter III of 
the Constitution. 
94
 Kenneth Campbell  argued that a substantive view needed to be taken, and that in 
substance an offence included things against which the law said there was a prima facie 
reason, while a defence in substance related to exonerating conditions: Criminal Law and 
Justice: Essays from the W G Hart Workshop (1987) p73; Victor Tadros and Stephen 
Tierney, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act’ (2004) 67 Modern 
Law Review 402; Victor Tadros, ‘Rethinking the Presumption of Innocence’ (2007) 1 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 193; Richard Glover, ‘Regulatory Offences and Reverse 
Burdens: The ‘Licensing Approach’ (2007) 71 Criminal Law Journal 259; Glanville 
Williams, ‘Offences and Defences’ (1982) 2 Legal Studies 233; Glanville Williams, ‘The 
Logic of Exceptions’ (1988) 47(2) Cambridge Law Journal 261 agreed that a substantive 
view needed to be taken. See Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence: Evidence 
and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart, 2010) ch 3. Some support for this view appears in 
dicta comments of Gummow J in Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 242 CLR 1, 64, who 
suggested in obiter that a law that deems to exist a fact that is an element of the offence 
with which the accused is charged might be a breach of Chapter III requirements. 
95
 This is relevant because sometimes, authorities are tempted to place what are really, in 
substance, elements of the offence into a defence, so placing the burden of proving them on 
the accused. The court must circumvent such attempts by taking a substantive approach to 
what truly is an element of the offence, and what is truly a defence. 
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draw some support from extra-judicial writings of McHugh J. His Honour 
muses: 
What of matters that straddle the borders of substance and procedure such 
as the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, ... the onus and 
standard of proof in civil and criminal cases and the use of deeming 
provisions and presumptions of fact? Can the parliament abolish or 
change these rights and matters? Would legislation purporting to do so be 
an invalid attempt by parliament to dictate and control the manner of 
exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth? ... (T)he power of 
parliament to affect these procedural and quasi-substantial matters in 
significant ways is open to serious doubt.
96
 
In relation to the proceeds of crime context where a person is asked to 
explain the lawfulness by which they acquired assets in the absence of a 
conviction against them, I do not deal here with the argument that such 
provisions are ‘civil’ such that references to Article 6 of the European 
Convention, Phillips and Sheldrake (or, arguably, references to Dietrich, 
since that decision occurred in a criminal context), are not applicable. 
This is because I have canvassed these arguments in an earlier article, and 
I take it as a given here that, in substance, such proceedings are criminal 
in nature, however they are described. There is substantial precedent in 
other jurisdictions for finding that such proceedings are in fact criminal 
and deserving of criminal due process protections, despite the label 
placed on them by the legislator.
97
 Specifically in the case of United 
States v United States Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Avenue, the 
Court found that a person affected by a forfeiture proceeding was entitled 
to presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt.
98
   
                                                          
96
 Michael McHugh, ‘Does Chapter III Protect Substantive as well as Procedural Rights?’ 
(2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235, 239. 
97
 Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co 416 US 663 (1974); Johnson v Attorney-
General of Alberta [1954] SCR 127; Boyd v United States 116 US 616 (1886); Frank La 
Salle, ‘The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a 
Prerequisite for Forfeiture’ (1995) 28 Akron Law Review 497; Peter Wright, ‘Criminal 
Punishment Without Civil Rights: The Criminal Proceeds and Instrument Bill’s Punitive 
Civil Sanctions’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 623; Kenneth 
Mann, ‘Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middle Ground Between Criminal and Civil Law’ 
(1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1795; Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Defending the 
Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure and Sanctions’ 
(2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21; Anthony Gray, ‘Forfeiture Provisions and the 
Criminal/Civil Divide’ (2012) 15(1) New Criminal Law Review 32. 
98
 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1032 (E.D.N.Y, 1991); in the context of proceedings against a 
juvenile that were said to be remedial and protective, rather than punitive, the United States 
Supreme Court insisted that criminal due process, including presumption of innocence, 
apply to the proceedings: In Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970). 
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2 Kable Principle 
Alternatively, in many quite recent cases the High Court has insisted that 
a court cannot be asked to exercise judicial power in a way that is 
inconsistent with the essential character of a court or the nature of judicial 
power.
99
 (For ease of convenience, I will refer to this as the ‘Kable 
principle’). There are related considerations about not undermining public 
confidence in the judiciary by asking courts to exercise powers that are 
incompatible with the nature of courts, or creating a perception that the 
court is acting at the direction of the executive.  
The suggestion is that asking a court at the final hearing stage, as in the 
case of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), to begin with a 
presumption that assets were acquired other than through lawful means, 
and requiring the person about whom an order is sought to prove 
otherwise, is asking the court to exercise power in a way that is contrary 
to the essential nature of judicial proceedings and the Kable principle. A 
typical feature of judicial proceedings is that the onus is on the accuser to 
prove the truth of their accusation, not for the person (in effect) accused 
to disprove the accusation made against them.
100
 It is true that 
Parliament’s ability to make rules of evidence is well-established.
101
  
However, there are limits. Of some support here is the recent High Court 
decision in International Finance Trust v New South Wales Crime 
Commission.
102
 In that case a majority of the High Court invalidated 
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aspects of New South Wales’ civil forfeiture regime. While the majority 
decision was based on reasons not directly relevant to the current 
discussion,
103
 members of the Court also noted that the legislation 
contained a reverse onus provision, requiring the court to make the 
forfeiture order (s 10) if the prosecutor showed reasonable grounds for 
suspecting the person affected owned property acquired other than 
through lawful means, with the person affected bearing the onus of proof 
under s 25 to show the lawfulness by which they obtained property, in 
order to get that property excluded from the order. Gummow and Bell JJ 
expressed their concern, in terms with which Heydon J agreed: 
The result is that the effect of the suspicion by an authorised officer of the 
Commission ... which founds a restraining order possibly may be of 
considerable scope and may be displaced only ... upon application under s 
25. But that application cannot succeed unless the applicant proves to the 
Supreme Court that it is more probable than not that the interest in 
property for which exclusion is sought is not ‘illegally obtained property’. 
The making of that proof by the applicant for an exclusion order requires 
the negating of an extremely widely drawn range of possibilities of 
contravention of the criminal law found in the common law, and State and 
Federal statute law ... The Supreme Court is conscripted for a process 
which requires in substance the mandatory ex parte sequestration of 
property upon suspicion of wrongdoing, for an indeterminate period ... In 
addition the possibility of release from that sequestration is conditional 
upon proof of a negative proposition of considerable legal and factual 
complexity. Section 10 engages the Supreme Court in activity which is 
repugnant in a fundamental degree to the judicial process as understood 
and conducted throughout Australia.
104
 
Clearly, the reverse onus provision was part, at least, of the reason why 
Gummow and Bell JJ concluded that the provisions offended against the 
so-called Kable principle. 
This position is supported by the European cases discussed above like 
Geerings and McIntosh which have required that the presumption of 
innocence be applied in cases where forfeiture proceedings have been 
taken against a person in the absence of a conviction against them for an 
offence relating to the particular property sought to be confiscated. The 
American cases have confirmed that anything affecting a ‘penalty’ must 
be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
105
 and I have argued that 
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confiscation of property is in substance a penalty, regardless of how it 
might be described. The United States Supreme Court is much less likely 
to upheld presumptions in proceedings where it is mandatory rather than 
an option for the fact-finder.
106
 In the Australian context, these 
presumptions are mandatory, requiring the court to make the order based 
on the presumption, unless the person affected can prove their innocence. 
The American and Canadian Courts have consistently insisted on a 
rational connection, at the very least, between the actual fact and the thing 
presumed, to guard against arbitrary exercise of power, or to preside over 
a loosening of due process rights. In the Australian context, the provision 
requires a court to presume, from the fact that a preliminary wealth order 
has been made (which is itself based essentially on the fact that the law 
enforcement authority has ‘reasonable grounds’ to suspect the property 
was unlawfully acquired)
107
, that the property was in fact unlawfully 
acquired, unless the person affected proves otherwise. In my opinion, this 
fails the test created by the United States Supreme Court – it is not 
rational to conclude from the fact that a judge is satisfied that a law 
enforcement authority has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that property was 
unlawfully acquired, that the property was in fact unlawfully acquired. In 
the Australian context, this is asking the court to proceed in an arbitrary 
manner incompatible with the nature of judicial power, contrary to the 
Kable principle. 
III CONCLUSION 
The High Court of Australia has been too timid in the protection afforded 
to fundamental human rights like the presumption of innocence. It has not 
upheld such a right in the fact of attempts by Parliament to circumvent 
difficulties in the prosecution obtaining evidence or proving its 
suspicions. It should do so. Constitutionally, the way for it to do so would 
be to re-assert that Chapter III requires that trials be fair, and that trials 
proceeding on an assumption of wrongdoing are liable not to be fair, as 
courts in other countries have found. It can rely on its Kable principle 
jurisprudence to disallow reverse onus provisions on the basis that they 
require a court to act in a non-judicial manner, undermining public 
confidence in the judiciary. There is no necessary rational connection 
between the fact that a prosecutor has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a 
person has acquired property unlawfully, and the fact that the person has 
done so. Leaps in logic such as this create a very dangerous precedent. 
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